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RIGHTS ACCORDED FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AGAINST WHOM
ADVERSE PERSONNEL ACTIONS ARE TAKEN
William P. Berzak*
Introduction
This article will briefly trace the development of procedures accorded federal employees against whom removal or other adverse action is taken by agendes and the channels available for appealing from such actions.'
The author hopes that this article will stimulate the study and understanding of the many facets and ramifications involved in personnel actions of the
federal government, our country's largest employer.2 The adverse action procedures and appellate processes represent an important part of the total federal
personnel system. This is necessarily so, since the procedures and appellate
processes have a significant impact on the security, morale, and well-being of
employees, which in turn have an important bearing on how well our Government functions. It follows that adverse action procedures and the appellate
processes are of vital concern in the area of labor-management relations which
have had and will continue to have an increasingly significant role in shaping
policies and procedures affecting the conditions of employment. Also, in addition to the Civil Service Commission, management, and unions, as will become
evident, the President, Congress, and the courts have added direction and thrust
to the development of our adverse action and appellate systems. It goes without saying that each employee should be accorded all of the rights to which he
is entitled under the Constitution, as well as under the laws and civil service
regulations. Since our Government operates on the basis of lawful authority
stemming from the same Constitution which protects employees' rights, there
is a need, within the framework of the Constitution, to balance competing rights
of our Government which must carry out its responsibilities in the public interest,
and its employees. A sensible accommodation to the rights of employees and
the rights of the Government as an employer calls for maturity, good judgment,
tolerance and restraint.
The Lloyd-LaFollette Act
Generally speaking, federal employees had very little protection from arbiChairman, Board of Appeals and Review, United States Civil Service Commission.
B.S.L. 1938, University of Minnesota; J.D. 1940, University of Minnesota; M.P.A. 1960, St.
Louis University.
1 Adverse actions referred to herein are discharge, suspension for more than thirty days,
furlough without pay, and reduction in rank or compensation. 5 C.FR. Part 752-B (1970)
contains the procedures governing adverse actions. Federal Personnel Manual Supplement
752-1, ADVERSE ACTIONS BY AGENCIES, formerly, ADVERSE ACTION-LAW AND REGULATIONS,
*

ANNOTATED contains a detailed analysis of the law and regulations pertaining to adverse actions. See also Personnel Methods Series No. 18, ADVERSE ACTION APPEALS PROCEDURE, for
sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.

2

At the end of August, 1971, worldwide federal civilian employment numbered 2,881,247.

BUREAU OF MANPOWER INFORMATION SYSTEMS, U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, FEDERAL
CIVILIAN MANPOWER STATISTICS (October, 1971).
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trary personnel actions prior to the passage of the Lloyd-LaFollette Act.' Although Civil Service Rule 8 promulgated by President William McKinley on
July 27, 1897, provided that removals from the competitive classified service
should not be made except for just cause and for reasons given in writing, employees had no administrative appeal rights from actions taken in violation of
the Rule. Moreover, courts were not prone to grant relief in the absence of
constitutional or statutory restriction on the power of removal. As noted by
the Civil Service Commission in the Twenty-ninth Report for the fiscal year
1912 (ended June 30, 1912), courts declined to take cognizance of Civil Service
Rule 8' on the ground that the assessment of a penalty for violation of the Rule
rested solely with the President. In fact, the United States Supreme Court dismissed a writ of error on December 10, 1906, on the ground that it did not have
jurisdiction to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia where a government employee did not deny the authority of the
President or his representative to dismiss him, but only contended that this
dismissal was illegal because certain rules and regulations of the civil service
were not observed.' However, the Lloyd-LaFollette Act appears to have set
the stage for increased emphasis on both procedural and substantive rights of
employees.
Section 6 of the Lloyd-LaFollette Act provided "[t]hat no person in the
classified civil service of the United States shall be removed therefrom except
for such cause as will promote the efficiency of said service and for reasons given
in writing, and the person whose removal is sought shall have notice of the
same and of any charges preferred against him, and be furnished with a copy
thereof, and also be allowed a reasonable time for personally answering the
same in writing; and affidavits in support thereof; . . ."'
The Lloyd-LaFollette Act contained no provisions for the issuance of regulations, enforcement, or acceptance of appeals by the Civil Service Commission.
Although employees were not granted a right of administrative appeal under
the Act, the statutory restriction which the Act placed on the power of removal
afforded employees a legal basis for appealing arbitrary removal to the courts.
Shortly after the Lloyd-LaFollette Act was enacted, the Post Office Department asked the Civil Service Commission whether Section 6 of the Act applied
to employees who were serving a probationary period. The Commission determined "that probationary period required by law preliminary to permanent
appointment is an essential part of the examinations held by the Commission
to ascertain the fitness of applicants, . . . and a probationer may be separated

from the service at any time during or at the expiration of the probationary
period without further formality than a written notification setting forth the
reasons in full."' The Commission's determination that Section 6 of the Lloyd-

3
4

Act of August 24, 1912, 37 Stat. 555, as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101, 7102, 7501.
UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT 22 (1912).

5 United States ex reL Taylor v. Taft. 203 U.S. 461 (1906).
6 Pub. L. No. 80-623 *(June 10, 1948) extended coverage of this section to suspension
of employees in the classified service.
7 Minutes of the United States Civil Service Commission, March 28, 1913.
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LaFollette Act was not applicable was confirmed by subsequent court decisions.8
Section 6 of the Act also provided "that membership in any society, association, club or other form of organization of postal employees not affiliated
with any outside organization imposing an obligation or duty upon them to
engage in any strike.. . against the United States, having for its objects, among
other things, improvements in the condition of labor of its members, including
hours of labor and compensation therefor and leave of absence, by any person
or groups of persons in said postal service, or the presenting by any such person
or groups of persons of any grievance or grievances to the Congress or any
Member thereof shall not constitute or be cause for reduction in rank or compensation or removal of such person or groups of persons from said service .... "
This provision is an important milestone in the development and expansion of
unions in the federal government, which have been growing at an accelerated
pace in recent years, and whose impact will be increasingly felt not only in
areas of adverse actions and employee appeals, but also in many facets of personnel administration and employment practices in which employees have a
keen interest. 9
Subsequent to the passage of the Lloyd-LaFollette Act, the Attorney General of the United States stated that a person in the classified civil service cannot
be deprived of his status except by removal as provided in Section 6 of the Act,
and "[ilt is for the head of a department and not the Civil Service Commission
to determine when there exists proper cause for removal."'" As previously indicated, the Lloyd-LaFollette Act contained no provisions for the issuance of
regulations, enforcement, or acceptance of appeals by the Commission.
Veterans' Preference Act of 1944
The Veterans' Preference Act of 1944" granted preference employees a
substantial degree of protection against arbitrary or erroneous adverse actions.
Section 1412 of the Act provided that "[n]o permanent or indefinite preference
eligible, who has completed a probationary or trial period employed in the civil
service. . . shall be discharged, suspended for more than thirty days, furloughed
without pay, reduced in rank or compensation . . . except for such cause as

will promote the efficiency of the service and for reasons given in writing. .

....

Section 14 also provided for ". . . at least thirty days' advance written notice . . . , stating any and all reasons, specifically and in detail, for any such
proposed action, . . . a reasonable time for answering the same personally and
8 United States ex tel. Kenny v. Morgenthau, (D.D.C. Feb. 28, 1937) (unreported).
See also Nadelhaft v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 930 (Ct. Cl. 1955); Bander v. United
States, 158 F. Supp. 564 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
9 "It is clear that unions are here to stay, to grow, to become involved in more and
more public personnel activities. Their influence is exerted now in many different ways but
will increasingly be felt through formalized collective bargaining ending in written agreements .

. ." Stanley, What Are Unions Doing to Merit Systems?

REv. (April 1970).
10 30 Op. ATr'y GEN. 79 (1913).

11 Act of June 27, 1944, 58 Stat. 387.
12 5 U.S.C. §§ 7511, 7512, 7701 (1964).
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in writing, and for furnishing affidavits in support of answer." Preference
eligibles were specifically granted a right of appeal to the Civil Service Commission from an adverse decision of an administrative officer so acting.
Section 14 also provided that "such preference eligible shall have the right
to make a personal appearance, or an appearance through a designated representative in accordance with such reasonable rules and regulations as may be
issued by the Civil Service Commission; after investigation and consideration
of the evidence submitted, the Civil Service Commission shall submit its findings
and recommendations to the proper administrative officer and shall send copies
of same to the appellant or to his designated representative. . . ."'
With
respect to the provision for "a personal appearance, or an appearance through
a designated representative," the Commission has in fact provided for a right
to a hearing (granted at the initial appellate level of a two-level appellate system) since it first issued regulations promulgating the provisions of Section 14 of
the Veterans' Preference Act. As might be expected, since the appeals were
limited to preference eligibles, veterans' organizations generally represented
those who appealed. Attorneys were seldom used and union representation was
practically unknown. There was a decided shift in the practice and custom with
respect to the use of representatives by the appellants subsequent to the issuance
of Executive Orders 10987 and 10988 which will be discussed in some detail
below.
Neither the Lloyd-LaFollette Act nor the Veterans' Preference Act as
originally enacted contained a provision to pay an employee for time lost from
work as a result of an erroneous suspension or separation. In its 62nd Annual
Report for the Fiscal Year 1945, ending June 30, 1945, the Civil Service Commission recommended legislation to correct this shortcoming:
Where a veteran's appeal of his dismissal is upheld by the Civil Service
Commission, and the head of the agency, acting on the recommendation of
the Commission, restores the veteran to his position, the head of the agency
should have the authority to compensate the veteran for the time lost from
work. Also, where a veteran or a nonveteran employee is suspended by the
head of the agency pending action on charges, and the employee is later
restored to his position, the head of1 4the agency should have the right to
authorize back pay for the time lost.
The Commission's recommended legislation came to fruition in Public Law
623, approved June 10, 1948, which amended Section 6 of the Lloyd-LaFollette
Act to provide that any person removed or suspended without pay under Section
6 of the Act,
who, after filing a written answer to the charges as provided under such
13 Pub. L. No. 80-325 (Aug. 4, 1947) amended Section 14 of the Veterans' Preference
Act to provide that ". . . it shall be mandatory for such administrative officer to take such
correction action as the Commission finally recommends." A companion bill, Pub. L. No.
80-741 '(June 22, 1948), included the following provision in Section 19 of the Veterans' Preference Act: "[a]ny recommendation by the Civil Service Commission, submitted to any
Federal agency, on the basis of the appeal of any preference eligible employee or former employee, shall be complied with by such agency."
14 UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE CoMmssSioN, ANNUAL IREPORT 5 (1945).
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subsection or after any further appeal to proper authority after receipt of
an adverse decision on the answer, is reinstated or restored to duty on the
ground that such removal or suspension was unjustified or unwarranted,
shall be paid compensation at the rate received on the date of such removal
or suspension, for the period for which he 'received no compensation with
respect to the position from which he was removed or suspended, less any
amounts earned by him through other employment during such period,
and shall for all purposes except the accumulation of leave be deemed to
have rendered service during such period.
Public Law 623 also provided that:
Any person who is discharged, suspended, or furloughed without pay,
under section 14 of the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944, as amended, who,
after answering the reasons advanced for such discharge, suspension, or
furlough or after an appeal to the Civil Service Commission, as provided
under such section, is reinstated or restored to duty on the ground that
such discharge, suspension, or furlough was unjustified or unwarranted,
shall be paid compensation at the rate received on the date of such discharge, suspension, or furlough for the period, and shall for all purposes
except the accumulation of leave be deemed to have rendered service during
such period....
The provisions cited above added immeasurably to the morale and security
of preference eligibles covered under Section 14 of the Veterans' Preference
Act, as amended, and to the employees covered under Section 6 of the LloydLaFollette Act, who were removed or otherwise disciplined in violation of the
pertinent sections of the Acts.
As was true with respect to Section 6 of the Lloyd-LaFollette Act, employees
serving a probationary period were not covered under Section 14 of the Veterans'
Preference Act.
Impact of Executive Orders 10987 and 10988 on
Adverse Action Procedures and Administrative Appeals
As is apparent from the above, nonpreference employees were accorded
no rights under the Veterans' Preference Act. This disparity in treatment ended
with the Commission's implementation of Section 14 of Executive Order 10988
dated January 17, 1962, which provided for the extension to all employees in
the competitive civil service rights identical in adverse action cases to those
provided preference eligibles under Section 14 of the Veterans' Preference Act
of 1944, as amended. It further 'provided employees in the competitive service
with the right to appeal to the Civil Service Commission from an adverse decision of the administrative officer so acting, such appeal to be processed in an
identical manner to that provided for appeals under Section 14 of the Veterans'
Preference Act. The Commission's regulations equalizing the procedural protections and appeal rights of nonpreference and preference employees in adverse
action cases became effective as to all adverse actions commenced by issuance of
a notification of a proposed action on and after July 1, 1962.
In addition to giving nonpreference employees in the competitive service
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rights identical to those given to preference eligibles under Section 14 of the
Veterans' Preference Act, Executive Order 10988 reflected recognition of the
fact that participation of employees in the formulation and implementation of
personnel policies affecting them contributes to the effective conduct of public
business. The Order provided the encouragement and the groundwork for dynamic growth of unionism in the federal service.15
The implementation of Section 14 of Executive Order 10988 gave coverage
in adverse action procedures and appeal rights to approximately one million
nonpreference employees. As union membership increased, more employees
turned to unions for guidance and representation in adverse action cases and
appeals."6
In light of better pay and other benefits accruing to federal employees in
recent years making federal jobs more desirable than previously, there has been
an upward trend in the number of appeals to the Commission from agency
adverse actions, reaching a record number during fiscal year 1971.'
Executive Order 10987, dated January 17, 1962, directed the head of
each department and agency, with certain exceptions, to establish a system for
the reconsideration of administrative decisions to take adverse action against
employees. The Executive Order was not applicable to the Central Intelligence
Agency, the National Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Tennessee Valley Authority. The Civil
15 Section 1 (a) of Executive Order 10988 reads as follows: "Employees of the Federal
Government shall have, and shall be protected in the exercise of, the right, freely and without
fear of penalty or reprisal, to form, join and assist any employee organization or to refrain
from any such activity. Except as hereinafter expressly provided, the freedom of such employees to assist any employee organization shall be recognized as extending to participation
in the management of the organization and acting for the organization in the capacity of an
organization representative, including presentation of its views to officials of the executive
branch, the Congress or other appropriate authority. The head of each executive department
and agency (hereinafter referred to as 'agency') shall take such action, consistent with law,
as may be required in order to assure that employees in the agency are apprised of the rights
described in this section, and that no interference, restraint, coercion or discrimination is
practiced within such agency to encourage or discourage membership in any employee
organization." See also Executive Order 11491, Labor-Management Relations in the Federal
Service, dated October 29, 1969, and Executive Order 11616, Executive Order 11491 as
amended dated August 26, 1971.
16
According to the latest annual recognitions and agreements census compiled by
CSC's Office of Labor-Management Relations, labor organizations extended their
exclusive coverage in the non-postal Federal work force by 9 percent-to a record
level of 916,381 employees. This record is particularly impressive in view of the
fact that there was a 5 percent decrease in employment among this group of employees during the period covered by the census. At the same time, the number of
postal workers in exclusive units declined by 1 percent.
The 9 percent gain in the reporting year ending November 1970 marked
renewed acceleration in the spread of exclusive representation, following 2 years of
dramatic braking during which the non-postal growth rate slowed from 45 percent
to 27 percent in 1968, and from 27 percent to 6 percent in 1969.
In Government as a whole-including the postal service-a 4 percent gain in
the number of employees in exclusive units pushed the grand total over the 1.5 million
mark (1,542,111), to 58 percent of the work force as against 54 percent a year
earlier. Spotlight on Labor Relations, 11 CIVIL SERVICE JOURNAL 4 (1971).
17 In fiscal year 1971 the first level offices of the Commission issued decisions on 5,712
appeals, 1,561 of which were adverse action cases. The Board of Appeals and Review received
986 adverse action appeals from decisions issued by first level offices and issued decisions on
777 adverse action cases. In fiscal year 1971 the Board processed 3,175 appeals, which included in addition to adverse action cases the following appeals: Reduction-in-force 1,147;
Retirement 233; Discrimination complaints 347; and Miscellaneous 671.

[Vol. 47: 853]

RIGHTS ACCORDED FEDERAL EMPLOYEES

Service Regulations implementing the Order are contained in Part 771 of the
Civil Service Regulations. 8
The Commission strengthened employee appeal rights under Part 771 of
the Civil Service Regulations, effective April 1, 1971. Among other things,
Part 771 was revised to provide that (1) the employee and his representative, if
otherwise in an active duty status, are entitled to a reasonable amount of official
time to prepare the appeal, (2) an examiner who meets the standards of experience and training prescribed by the Commission must conduct the hearing, (3)
if the agency determines that it is not administratively practicable to produce
certain employees requested as witnesses by the examiner, and if the examiner
determines that a full and fair hearing cannot be held without those witnesses,
he may postpone the hearing until the agency complies with his request, (4)
the hearing must be recorded and transcribed verbatim, (5) the examiner must
make a written report of findings and recommendations in all cases, (6) the
official authorized to decide the appeal must accept and act on the examiner's
recommendations unless (a) he is the head of the agency, (b) he desires to take
a less severe action than that recommended by the examiner, or (c) he determines that the recommendations are unacceptable. If the official authorized to
decide the appeal determines that the recommendations are unacceptable, he
must refer the appeal file to a higher level of authority for decision with a specific
statement of the reasons for his determination.
Civil Service Regulations Governing Adverse Actions
The Commission's current regulations 9 governing adverse actions are
grounded, for the most part, on the provisions of Section 14 of. the Veterans'
Preference Act of 1944, as amended, which now appear in 5 U.S.C. 7511,
7512, 7701. The cited regulations will not be set forth in detail here, but some
highlights will be touched on. The most recent changes in adverse action procedures which became effective November 1, 1970, provide, in substance, that:
(1) the material relied on by the agency to support its reasons for the proposed
adverse action, including statements of witnesses, documents, and investigative
reports or excerpts therefrom, shall be assembled and made available to the employee for his review; (2) material which cannot be disclosed to the employee
may not be used by an agency to support its action; (3) the employee is entitled
to a reasonable amount of official time to prepare his answer if he is otherwise
in an active duty status; and (4) the agency's notice of adverse decision shall
inform the employee which of the reasons in the notice of proposed adverse action were found sustained and which were found not sustained. The aforementioned changes inure to the employees' benefit since they insure a greater
degree of objectivity, fairness, and due process in adverse action proceedings.
Section 752.202 of the Civil Service Regulations2 ° provides, with certain

18 5 C.F.R. Part 771 (1971).
19 5 C.F.R. Part 752-B (1971).
20 5 C.F.R. § 752.202 "(1971).
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exceptions,"' that an employee against whom adverse action is sought is entitled
to "at least 30 full days' advance written notice stating any and all reasons,
specifically and in detail, for the proposed action." Failure to give the required
advance notice constitutes reversible error. Twenty-nine days will not suffice.
Also, when the 30th day of a 30-day notice period falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, the action may not be effected earlier than the next business day.22
The requirement that "any and all reasons" must be stated in the advance
notice means that the agency cannot rely on any reasons which are not specifically set forth in the notice of proposed adverse action. If the removal is based
on any reasons not specified in the advance notice, the action is fatally defective.
With respect to the regulatory requirement for specificity and detail, the
reasons given in the notice of proposed adverse action must be stated with sufficient clarity and detail to afford the employee a full and fair opportunity to
defend against the proposed action. The employee is entitled to answer the
notice of proposed adverse action both orally and in writing. If he requests an
opportunity to answer orally, the agency representative designated to hear the
answer must be a person who has authority either to make a final decision or to
recommend what the final decision should be. The agency is required to consider the employee's answer before making a final decision. As previously indicated the notice of adverse decision must inform the employee which of the
reasons contained in the notice of proposed adverse action were found sustained
and which were found not sustained.
Cause as Will Promote the Efficiency of the Service
The Lloyd-LaFollette Act, the Veterans' Preference Act, and Civil Service
Regulations promulgated relative thereto, all provide that none of the specified
actions shall be taken against any of the covered employees "except for such
cause as will promote the efficiency of the service." A question which often
arises is "What constitutes such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service?" Generally a "cause" for adverse action is a recognizable offense against
the employer-employee relationship, including inefficient performance of duties
and improper conduct on or off the job. Section 731.201 of the Civil Service
Regulations2 lists "Reasons for disqualification" which often constitute sufficient
reason or "cause" for disciplinary or adverse action.
21 The exceptions are contained in Section 752.202(c) of the Civil Service Regulations,
5 C.F.R. § 752.202(c) (1971).
22 For more details see subchapter S2-3 of Federal Personnel Manual Supplement 752-1,
ADVERSE ACTIONS BY AGENCIES, formerly, ADvERsa ACTION-LAW AND REGULATIONS, ANNOTATED.

23

Section 731.201 of the Civil Service Regulations provides the following:
Subject to subpart C of this part, the Commission may deny an applicant examination, deny an eligible appointment, and instruct an agency to remove an appointee
for any of the following reasons:
(a) Dismissal from employment for delinquency or misconduct;
(b) Criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct;

(c) Intentional false statement or deception or fraud in examination or appointment;
(d) Refusal to furnish testimony as required by section 5.3 of this chapter;
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However, it is important to note that an identifiable "cause!' may or may
not warrant adverse action. What constitutes a sufficient reason or "cause" depends upon numerous factors including, but not limited to, the nature of the
offense, the type position involved, elements of provocation, if any, and mitigating circumstances.
In the light of the above, let us dwell briefly on the subject of "immoral
conduct" which may or may not constitute a proper basis for removal or other
adverse action. Recent court decisions reflect the desirability, if not the necessity, of considering the employee's conduct vis-i.-vis its effect on the efficiency
of the service, and stating this connection on the record along the way to determining whether or not adverse action is appropriate under the circumstances. In
the case of Norton v.Macy,2" the court held that the employing agency must
demonstrate some rational basis for concluding that a discharge promotes the
efficiency of the service. The court went on to say that a finding that an employee has done something immoral, indecent, or disgraceful will support a dismissal only if the acts of the employee have an ascertainable deleterious effect
on the efficiency of the service. In the cases of Frank v.Hampton,2 5 and Dorais
v. Snell,26 the respective courts set aside removals for alleged immoral conduct
(homosexuality). Both decisions were based on Norton v. Macy. To dismiss
an employee for immoral conduct, without acting arbitrarily or capriciously, the
agency must state how the alleged conduct relates to occupational competence
or fitness.
In Mindel v. United States Civil Service Commission, " the court held that
plaintiff's termination for living with a young lady without the benefit of marriage violated due process since it was arbitrary and capricious, and that it
violated his right to privacy as guaranteed by the ninth amendment. The court
stated that "[e]ven if Mindel's conduct can be characterized as 'immoral,' he
cannot constitutionally be terminated from government service on this ground
absent a rational nexus between this conduct and his duties as a postal clerk...."
It is evident from the above that immoral or other conduct generally will
not constitute "'cause as will promote the efficiency of the service" unless a rational nexus is shown between the alleged conduct and the efficiency of the service.
Appeals to the Civil Service Commission
As previously indicated, Section 14 of the Veterans' Preference Act specifically granted preference eligibles the right to appeal to the Civil Service Commission, and nonpreference employees were granted identical appeal rights as
a result of Section 14 of Executive Order 10988. The Commission's appellate

24 417
25 No.
26 No.
27 312

(e) Habitual use of intoxicating beverages to excess;
(f) Reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of the person involved to the Government
of the United States; or
(g) Any legal or other disqualification which makes the individual unfit for
service.
F.2d 1161 '(D.C. Cir. 1969).
6908999 (N.D. Ill.,
Oct. 27, 1970).
S-1012 (E.D. Calif., Nov. 25, 1970).
F. Supp. 485 (N.D. Calif. 1970).
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system pertaining to adverse actions consists of two levels of appeal. 2' The appeal must be in writing, but no particular form is required. The appellant is
entitled to a hearing. The formal, judicial rules of evidence are not strictly observed. It is well established that evidence in administrative proceedings appeals
need not be tested by court standards. The general rule appears to be as stated
by the United States Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit in Sista v. Civil
Aeronautics Board: "The admission of irrelevant or incompetent matter before
an administrative agency does not constitute reversible error, if there is substantial evidence in the record to sustain the agency's determination." 9 Some designated representatives of employees have expressed the opinion that courtroom
procedures and rules of evidence should be observed strictly as in criminal
trials. However, it should be borne in mind that the adverse action proceedings
are administrative in nature. The cause of action generally involves an alleged
offense against the employer-employee relationship, and justice often would
not be served by converting the administrative process to a judicial one. More
often than not employees have won their cases with evidence, although having
probative value, which would have been excluded had it been necessary to
"meet the courtroom test." Keeping in mind that agencies are called upon to
perform certain functions in the public interest with a limited number of employees and limited funds, the administrative system should not become bogged
down by overly formalized procedures.
The decisions of the Commission's first level offices contain an analysis of
the evidence and findings. If a determination is made that the adverse action
was improper, the decision will contain a recommendation that the agency
cancel the action. Under the law"0 the recommended corrective action is mandatory.
Generally an agency or individual who is dissatisfied with an initial appellate decision issued within the Civil Service Commission may appeal to the
Board of Appeals and Review."' The case is adjudicated on the basis of the
entire appellate file, including the record developed by the Commission's office
having initial appellate jurisdiction, in addition to any further representations
made by the parties to the Board. Decisions of the Board exhaust the appellant's
administrative remedies, and there is no further right of appeal within the Commission. However, the Civil Service Regulations 2 provide that the Commissioners may, in their discretion, reopen and reconsider any previous decision
when the party requesting reopening submits written argument or evidence
which tends to establish that:
(1) New and material evidence is available that was not readily available when the previous decision was issued;
28 Generally speaking, the Directors of the Commission's Regional Offices have initial
appellate jurisdiction over adverse action appeals from employees working within their respective regional boundaries, and the Commission's Appeals Examining Office in Washington,
D. C., has initial appellate jurisdiction in adverse action cases from employees working within
the metropolitan area of Washington, D. C., and in certain areas outside the continental
limits of the United States.
29 179 F.2d 47, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
30 5 U.S.C. §§ 7511, 7512, 7701 (1964).
31 See note 17, supra, for statistics on appeals for fiscal year 1971.
32 5 C.F.R. § 772.308 (1971).
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(2) The previous decision involves an erroneous interpretation of law
or regulation or a misapplication of established policy; or
(3) The previous decision is of a precedential nature involving a new
or unreviewed policy consideration that may have effects beyond
the actual case at hand, or is otherwise of such an exceptional nature as to merit the personal attention of the Commissioners.
Judicial Review
Not infrequently, inquiries are received from appellants or their representatives as to whether they can go to court after exhausting their administrative
remedies within the Commission, indicating an unawareness concerning the extent to which federal courts have jurisdiction in their cases or the scope of
judicial review. There is no specific statutory provision governing judicial review of adverse personnel actions taken against federal employees.33 However,
when an appellant has exhausted his administrative remedies,3 4 he generally
has the choice of proceeding in a United States district court for back pay up
to the amount of $10,000 or for reinstatement or both, or proceeding in the
Court of Claims for monetary relief. The jurisdictional basis for appealing in
federal courts will not be discussed herein.
With respect to the scope of judicial review, there has been a gradual
movement from unreviewability early in the century to something approximating
review in accordance with the substantial evidence rule, although the development in the various circuits has been somewhat uneven." Court decisions during
recent years reflect that judicial review of administrative action involving government employees is generally limited to a determination (1) whether there has
been substantial compliance with statutory and regulatory requirements; and
(2) upon review of the administrative record, whether the challenged action
was arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious, and was supported by substantial
evidence."s
Where to from Here?
The Commission is never in the position of saying that all is well in the
adverse action and appellate area. The need is for the Commission con33 This is a matter which the Civil Service Commission, the Administrative Conference
of the United States, the Civil Service Law Committee of the Bar Association of the District
of Columbia and other organizations are devoting effort to and which may result in recommended legislative action granting the statutory right to appeal to courts from Commission final
administrative appellate decisions.
34 Where Congress has imposed an administrative tribunal between claimant and the
court, the claim does not accrue until the executive body has acted or declined to act.
Friedman v. United States, 159 Ct. Cl. 1, 310 F.2d 381 '(1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 932
(1963). See also Kandall v. United States, 186 Ct. Cl. 900, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837
(1969).
35 See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29.07 '(Supp. 1970).
36 Meehan v. Macy, 392 F.2d 822 (D.C., Cir. 1968); Dabney v. Freeman, 123 D.C. App.
166, 358 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Pelicone v. Hodges, 116 D.C. App. 32, 320 F.2d 754
(1963); Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Halsey v. Nitze, 390 F.2d 142
(4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 392 U. S. 939; Taylor v. United States Civil Service Commission, 374 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1967); Burka v. Carpenter, 387 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1967);
Charlton v. United States, 412 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1969).
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stantly to keep abreast of changes and refinements in the courts' notions
of what due process and permissible managerial authority37 includes. The
Commission solves one set of problems and new ones arise.
Consistent with the above quotation was an announcement made by the
Commission's Executive Director, Bernard Rosen, on August 5, 1971, to the
Interagency Advisory Group"8 that the Commission's recently established toplevel planning body known as the Executive Planning Group has identified
adverse actions and appeals as one of the areas for early study,"0 and this has
been approved by the Commissioners. It almost goes without saying that revisions will continue to be made in adverse action procedures and the appellate
system. Changes, as they occur, must meet the requirements of fairness and due
process and at the same time enable the Government to carry out effectively
the responsibilities entrusted to it.
Summary and Conclusions
Prior to the 20th century, federal employees had very little protection
from arbitrary dismissal from the service. In 1912 the Lloyd-LaFollette Act
set the stage for increased emphasis on both procedural and substantive rights
of employees. However, the Act did not provide a right of administrative appeal for violation of the provisions contained therein. It did provide a legal
basis for appealing arbitrary removal to the courts. In 1944 veterans were
granted (1) substantial procedural and substantive protections from arbitrary
adverse actions and (2) the right of appeal to the Civil Service Commission.
The same protections were accorded to nonpreference employees in the competitive civil service with the implementation of Section 14 of Executive Order
10988 in 1962. The Order also reflected recognition of the fact that participation of employees in the formulation of personnel policies affecting them contributes to the effective conduct of public business, and the Order provided the
encouragement and the groundwork for dynamic growth of unionism in the
federal service. The President, Congress, the courts, the Civil Service Commission, agencies, and unions have all played roles in the development of our
adverse action and appellate systems. Revisions will continue to be made in
adverse action procedures and the appellate systems which will not only assure
due process and fairness to employees, but at the same time enable our Government to carry out effectively the responsibilities entrusted to it.

37 Nammack & Dalton, Notes on Appropriatenessof the Current Adverse Action and Appeals System, 19 Am. U. L. REv. 385 (1970).
38 The Interagency Advisory Group is composed of personnel directors of federal departments and agencies.
39 The Administrative Conference of the United States is currently reviewing the appellate process, and will render a published report when its review and analysis have been
completed--expected to be in late 1972.

